Democratic Party Proposes Bill to Completely Abolish Prosecutorial Supplementary Investigation Authority; Aims for Passage This Month

Background of the Push to Completely Abolish Prosecutorial Supplementary Investigation Authority

Under the leadership of the Democratic Party of Korea, a revision to the Criminal Procedure Act aimed at completely abolishing prosecutors' supplementary investigation authority has been referred to the National Assembly's Legislation and Judiciary Committee. The party's legislative reform task force has decided to propose the related bill as early as the 9th, aiming for passage within this month, and has entered a race against time. Supplementary investigation authority refers to the power of prosecutors to conduct additional investigations after the police have completed an inquiry but before indictment. The move is heavily underpinned by the intent to disperse the excessive authority of the prosecution and strengthen the independence of investigations as part of judicial reform.

The immediate catalyst for this legislation was the suspicion of collusion between the active-duty police executive father of Jang Yun-gi, the murderer of a Gwangju high school student, and the investigation team. With public trust in police investigations hitting rock bottom, criticism intensified that the prosecution failed to properly verify the case and accepted it uncritically. Consequently, the political movement to clarify responsibility by completely eliminating the prosecutors' supplementary investigation authority has accelerated.

Key Contents of the Revision and Subjects of Application

The core of the proposed Criminal Procedure Act revision is to completely block the supplementary investigation authority granted to prosecutors under current law. If the revision passes, prosecutors will determine whether to indict based solely on the investigation records transferred by the police. This effectively eliminates the legal basis for prosecutors to intervene in reinvestigating cases or supplementing evidence. This is a systemic design intended to completely separate the investigative powers of the police and prosecution to ensure mutual checks and balances.

Simultaneously, an analysis of the national fiscal burden resulting from the addition of 20 investigators to the Kwak Chang-yeon 2nd Independent Counsel team was presented. According to the cost estimation by the National Assembly Budget Office, increasing the special counsel personnel by 20 is projected to require an additional budget of approximately 400 million won over 2.5 months. This serves as a concrete fiscal constraint that must be considered in the process of strengthening investigative capabilities during the operation of the special counsel system.

Ruling vs. Opposition Debate and Stance of Civic Groups

The ruling party emphasizes that abolishing supplementary investigation authority is inevitable to complete the final piece of the puzzle of prosecutorial reform. The Reunification Democratic Party, which has long advocated for clearing out judicial abuses since the 21st general election, is also in a mood of active agreement with the bill's passage. In contrast, the People Power Party is reacting fiercely, arguing that the complete abolition will lead to side effects. The opposition party criticizes that if supplementary investigation authority is abolished, the opportunity to correct erroneous police investigation results will disappear, ultimately leaving only the victims in tears.

People Power Party Leader Dong-Hyuk Jang attended a rally in Incheon on the 8th and pointed out that the ruling party-led special counsel would struggle to gain legal legitimacy. Furthermore, he expressed his intention to continue an offensive outside the National Assembly to secure the authority to recommend a special counsel for the National Election Commission. As such, the ruling and opposition parties are locked in a tense tug-of-war, each presenting its own logic over a single bill. As this issue shakes the very foundations of the judicial system, criticisms from academia and legal experts continue that measures to control police investigations must be put in place first.

Prospects for Legislative Process and Social Ripple Effects

The Democratic Party of Korea plans to swiftly conclude the review of the bill, centered on members of the National Assembly's Legislation and Judiciary Committee, and bring it to a vote at the plenary session. If the revision, proposed as early as the 9th, is processed by the end of this month as initially planned, the redefinition of roles between investigative agencies is expected to become a reality. However, strong obstruction moves from the opposition, such as a filibuster or vote boycott, are anticipated, meaning the possibility of delays in the National Assembly schedule cannot be ruled out.

If the system is implemented, the scope of work for prosecutors and police will be clearly distinguished, which could significantly reduce the practice of shifting blame during investigations. However, if separate external monitoring bodies or institutional safety nets to monitor arbitrary police investigations are not established simultaneously, side effects are feared. As with the cost estimates, concrete discussions are essential on how to efficiently reallocate investigative infrastructure within the limited national budget. Ultimately, the legislative discussion must conclude in a direction that protects the fundamental rights of the people from power structures and establishes a fair judicial system.