National Assembly Passes Criminal Procedure Code Revision, Completely Stripping Prosecutors of Direct Investigation Authority and Granting Police Case Termination Powers

On the 31st, a revision to the Criminal Procedure Act aimed at completely stripping prosecutors of their direct investigation powers was passed at the National Assembly plenary session, led by the ruling Democratic Party. This marks a historic turning point and a comprehensive overhaul of South Korea's judicial system, maintained since its enactment in 1954 over the past 70 years, by separating the entities responsible for handling single cases. With the legal confirmation of a structure where the police are exclusively responsible for cases from initial investigation to conclusion, the acute power struggles between the two investigative agencies have entered a new phase.

Background and Key Legislative Details of Institutional Reform

Previously, prosecutors exercised the power of supplementary investigation, allowing them to reinvestigate cases referred by the police. As this process enabled individual prosecutors to directly指挥 investigations and steer their direction in specific cases, persistent social criticism arose regarding the monopoly on investigations and abuse of authority. The primary objective of prosecutorial reform was to disperse these immense powers to ensure the political neutrality of the authority.

The core of the passed revision is clear: the complete separation of investigation and prosecution. The police secure the authority to conclude investigations directly, while the role of prosecutors is reduced to that of a reviewer, determining solely whether to indict a case. In principle, prosecutors are prohibited from conducting independent additional investigations based on police records or summoning suspects for reinvestigation, as was done in the past.

However, exceptions exist for all cases. The revision includes limited exception clauses for instances where grounds for dismissal of prosecution arise under current law or for major national issues such as special investigations related to the National Election Commission, leaving room for prosecutorial intervention.

Positive Interpretation: Power Diffusion and Strengthened Accountability

The ruling party evaluates the passage of this bill as a fundamental reform of the judicial system, achieving a perfect separation of investigation and prosecution. Analysis suggests that this blocks the risk of arbitrary judicial operations that could arise when a single position, the prosecutor, monopolized the two immense powers of investigation and indictment requests. As they now exclusively handle indictment authority, prosecutors are tasked with the responsibility of more objectively assessing the acquisition of legal evidence to present suspects to court and the probability of winning a trial.

Economic and judicial experts are monitoring how this institutional change will impact the pace of investigations into massive economic cases or complex financial crimes. It appears that unless the police significantly bolster their own specialized investigative personnel and digital forensic equipment, gaps will likely arise in investigations into major corporate crimes or political corruption. It is expected that subsequent legislation to cultivate the police's specialized investigative capabilities through national investment will be necessary to guarantee the stability of the system.

Concerns Over Reduced Investigative Authority and Debate on Judicial Vacuums

Concerns from the opposition are significant. Some members of the opposition and the legal community point out that the instantaneous transfer of investigative powers will inevitably lead to a qualitative decline in criminal prosecution. The argument is that in major economic corruption cases requiring long-term and intricate design, if police, with relatively less investigative experience, take charge of the core of evidence collection, a stream of not-guilty verdicts in trials is feared. There are also perspectives guarding against a new form of power concentration resulting from the inflated authority of the police.

This conflict also showed a clear divergence within the political sphere. Lawmaker Kwak Sang-eon, a legal professional, and others cast dissenting votes, arguing that hasty passage of the bill could exacerbate judicial suffering for the people. The counterargument is that in a situation where specialized investigative personnel are lacking, a mechanical transfer of authority alone makes it difficult to achieve the fundamental goal of the judiciary: protecting the safety and property rights of the people.

Future Legislative Prospects Following Judicial System Reorganization

With the passage of the Criminal Procedure Act revision at the plenary session, the handling of follow-up bills regarding the police's final termination authority and the internal reorganization of the National Police Agency have emerged as top priorities. There is an urgent need for the Supreme Court and the Supreme Prosecutors' Office to establish detailed implementation guidelines that clearly define the practical boundaries between investigation and prosecution.

In the short term, transitional measures are expected to be necessary to minimize on-site confusion resulting from the institutional change. In the long term, there is a high possibility that additional judicial reform discussions will continue towards establishing checks and balances on the prosecution's monopoly on indictment. For this reorganization of power agencies to lead to substantive human rights protection and the realization of fair judicial justice, the high-level specialization of police investigations and active infrastructure investment at the national level must be supported in the coming years.